What is the logical error in morality

ESSAY


Our everyday moral understanding

Even according to many of its opponents, moral realism is characterized by the fact that it best fits our everyday moral understanding. After that, our moral judgments can be true or false. If they are true, it is because there is something that makes them true. The judgment "this act is cowardly" is true because the act has the quality of cowardice. Whether the property belongs to the action does not depend on the attitudes we have towards the action. We may be wrong: we believe, to the best of our knowledge, that the act is reprehensible and, in fact, it is not. At the same time, we are aware that moral facts such as that the corresponding action is reprehensible are fundamentally different from other types of facts such as those of physics: they are practical facts. We assume that anyone who has recognized the reprehensibility of a possible act has also recognized a good reason for refraining from the reprehensible act. However, anyone who makes a physical judgment does not enter into such a normative obligation on a practical reason.

Closely connected with this normative dimension of morality is its motivational one: anyone who judges that it is reprehensible to act in a certain way and yet acts in this way exposes himself to the suspicion of hypocrisy. If he had been sincere and had actually recognized what he seemed to recognize with his judgment, namely the reprehensibility of the action, then, we believe, he should also have been motivated to refrain from the action - at least if there were no competing points of view (e.g. of self-interest) point in a different direction.

If one tries to explain the mentioned features of our moral practice on an ontological level, the following picture emerges: There are moral facts that make our moral judgments true (or false). These facts are objective in the sense that our attitudes towards them are not constitutive of them. They have a normative dimension in that they give us good reasons to act in a certain way. After all, they are motivationally effective insofar as the person who has recognized their existence in a corresponding evaluation is also pro tanto motivated to act accordingly.

John Mackie's review

This ontological model underlying moral realism seems at the same time to speak the judgment about it. This is exactly the conclusion drawn by John Mackie in his 1977 book Ethics. Mackie has no doubt that our everyday moral practice implicitly fixes us on a model that moral realism makes philosophically explicit. Only, according to him, it is precisely these ontological obligations that entangle our moral practice in an error that is constitutive for it. On the one hand, facts appear as the realist assumes them against the background of an ontology that does not fall behind the insights of modern times in favor of an uncontrolled re-enchantment of reality - in Mackie's famous formulation - as queer. Worse still, these entities appear ontologically inconsistent in a world like ours: there can be no such moral fact. Mackie develops three basic arguments for this thesis:

- Objective moral values ​​are strange in two respects: On the one hand, no satisfactory solution can be found to the problem of the relationship between moral properties and natural properties. On the other hand, it cannot be satisfactorily clarified how such objective values ​​can guide our actions. The assumption that objective values ​​can themselves exert an attraction on our will is nothing more than an inconsistent attempt to artificially force together the mutually exclusive characteristics of objectivity and prescriptivity in the questionable notion of a magnetism of the good.


- The epistemological problem arises of how we can recognize such entities that are remarkable for ontological reasons. Since none of the epistemic abilities with which we are familiar can fulfill such a task, the only option left is to postulate a special moral sense, the only function of which is the knowledge of objective values. Such a postulate, however, is obviously ad hoc, insofar as nothing speaks in favor of it other than the fact that it allows the epistemological problem mentioned to be solved, and is therefore to be rejected.

- Such objective values ​​have no function whatsoever in explaining the convergence of our moral judgments (or their lack thereof). If there are indeed objective values, there must also be a possibility that we know about them. This in turn implies that the best explanation to our knowledge is that p, is in p. But objective values ​​do not play such a role in explaining moral agreement or moral differences of opinion. That we agree, for example, that torturing innocent people is reprehensible, can be fully explained as an expression of common ways of life, without having to refer in any way to the reprehensibility of the action itself.

All three arguments lead John Mackie to his error theory, according to which moral judgments are truthful, but always have the truth value 'false'.

A first strategy to meet Mackie's challenge

A first strategy can be to join Mackie's sobering diagnosis and ask about the consequences of it. We believe that at least occasionally we make true moral judgments without realizing that we cannot do so because the entities that alone could make them true do not exist. If this is accepted, the following three options remain:

- We can try to simply give up our moral practice in favor of other normative practices that are not based on irredeemable ontological obligations. Instead of categories such as morally right and wrong, we would have to resort to aesthetic categories, for example, unless a completely parallel theory of error can be worked out for aesthetic evaluations. (moral nihilism)

- We can look for a new foundation for our moral practice, for example in a constructivist framework that understands moral facts no longer as entities to be discovered but as entities to be invented. However, if the ontological assumptions are actually constitutive for moral practice to the extent that Mackie thinks, then we would have to speak more precisely of a replacement of morality by a successor practice, which would at best be linked to its predecessor by vague similarities in the functional role .

- In the sense of so-called moral fictionalism, we can work on our moral practice in the awareness of the error on which it is based in the form of a 'morality of as if' in
try to hold onto the hope that this will nevertheless be able to inspire us in a fruitful way (analogous to fictional literature, which we also do not confuse with reality).

The second strategy

These radical consequences of the first strategy now give many philosophers the opportunity to critically review the premises of the underlying diagnosis of an error that is constitutive for moral practice - this is the basic idea of ​​the second strategy: Is there actually such an error, or is it due? is it not rather the appearance of such an error of distortion of the ontological implications of our moral practice? Possibly, the noncognitivist points out, despite its admittedly truth-functional surface, our moral discourse is actually based on the expression of subjective attitudes (be it emotions or prescriptions). Since these are not capable of truth, they do not even raise the question of their truth conditions (which have led us into the ontological difficulties mentioned).

But even assuming that our moral judgments are truthful and presuppose facts that make them true - let us really assume that these moral facts are completely independent of subjective achievements and that they are practical in the double sense that they necessarily establish normative reasons and motivate them to act pro tanto necessary?

If this is answered in the negative, it could be that we are dealing with moral facts with facts that are not themselves genuinely practical. Externalist realism, such as that represented by David Brink or in German-speaking countries by Peter Schaber, argues that they only become practical if they are made the subject of suitable subjective attitudes. It is not the fact that the act is reprehensible that gives me a reason to refrain from it, but my desire to adhere to morality and not to commit a morally reprehensible act, along with the knowledge that this act would be reprehensible.

Externalist realism can of course be countered by the fact that denying the intrinsic normative power of moral facts does not remove the annoyance of morality, but of morality itself - for what should be more fundamental for it than the categorical claim that we make with it?

The third strategy

In contrast to the second and in line with the first strategy, however, it can be admitted that Mackie's analysis of the ontological obligations to which our moral practice fixes us and which are explicated in the context of moral realism is entirely correct, whereas in contrast to the first strategy, one can admit that however, denies that moral realism must therefore prove untenable. According to this third strategy, genuinely practical, objective moral facts as part of reality are by no means strange or just as strange as the world as a whole is strange. Our moral practice is based not on erroneous but on correct assumptions. There is no reason - as the first strategy assumes - to look for successors or to suspend them in their claim to truth and to hold onto them merely in the 'as if' mode, nor is there any reason to - in the sense of the second strategy - to be interpreted in such a way that it does not even have to enter into the ontological obligations that make it appear questionable.

This third strategy, that of strong moral realism, is the least used of the three strategies mentioned in the current debate. Strong moral realism has barely benefited from the renaissance of moral realism, at least in Anglo-American philosophy, from the 1970s to the most recent. At most, it remained present as a 'scarecrow', which, with labels such as intuitionism or value platonism, had to serve as a figure of demarcation to clarify one's own positions. In the German-speaking area, on the other hand, the strong realism is primarily combined with the value theories of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, which still appear in some representations of analytical ethics, but only to provide cautionary examples of excessive ontological premises.

The moral realism in the metaethical debate

The mainstream variants of moral realism, under the impression of Mackie's objections and in the sense of the second of the strategies distinguished above, tend towards a revisionary interpretation of moral phenomenology. So z. For example, the intrinsic normative claim of morality is denied in order to facilitate the naturalization of moral facts. In order to avoid having to reject our moral practice with Mackie in toto as erroneous, it is conceded that it contains partial errors that must be cleared up through philosophical reflection. This, however, undermines the presumption in favor of moral realism, which is based on its matching relationship to the unabbreviated moral phenomenology, as it is aptly reconstructed by Mackie himself. Strong moral realism, on the other hand, sees no reason for such revisionary reinterpretations; it can and will share Mackie's hermeneutics of our moral practice just as much as it will deny that it entangles us in the error noted by Mackie.

But what exactly characterizes the position of strong moral realism?

The minimal moral realism

A minimal moral realist advocates the following two theses:

- With our moral evaluations we make claims that their illocutionary role is not limited to expressing subjective attitudes and / or making appeals to the listener. So he is a cognitivist in relation to moral judgments.

- He not only considers moral evaluations to be truthful, but also believes that some of them are actually true. In this way, the realist distinguishes himself from an error theory like the Mackies.

But how is the ontological status of the entities that make our moral evaluations true or false to be determined? Strong and weak realism are divided on this question.

Minimal realism is not enough to adequately determine realistic positions in metaethics. Christine Korsgaard's distinction between procedural and substantial realism allows us to see why this is the case. Even a Kantian procedural realist like Korsgaard assumes that there are correct moral judgments. But while the substantial realist thinks that our moral decision-making processes must be measured by whether they allow us to look at moral reality, for the procedural realist these processes, such as that of the categorical imperative, are themselves constitutive for the correct answer to a moral question. If procedural realism were to apply, the theory of error would again come to nothing from the outset - and this is exactly the opinion of philosophers such as Nagel and Korsgaard: For the procedural realist, as opposed to the substantive, we do not make any ontological judgments in our moral judgments Commitment to a moral reality whose supposed ontological and epistemological peculiarity could then worry us. Our moral practice always gets by without them.

Regardless of whether the procedural strategy is convincing, I would like to advocate not using the concept of realism for it, but that of objectivism - because procedural positions give up at least one core intuition that a realist has with regard to any subject area is represented. Real is, as Bernard Williams puts it, “what is there anyway”. For the proceduralist, this is precisely not the case: our moral knowledge is not due to the encounter with an independent reality, but to the application of procedures that have to be obtained from the structure of practical rationality, for example.

With the exclusion of such procedural approaches, the field of possible positions within moral realism is not impermissibly restricted. This becomes clear when one asks about the status of this moral reality.

Are moral values ​​completely independent of subjective performance, or are they only partially independent of them?

The strong moral realist assumes that there is indeed complete independence; the weak moral realist is content with partial independence. Both agree that moral values ​​are not entirely dependent on actual subjective responses.

Weak moral realists, who are referred to as sensitivity theorists or no-priority theorists in the analytical debate, mostly suggest interpreting moral values ​​analogously to secondary qualities. This idea may come as a surprise at first glance, as empiricists like Hume and Locke had just relied on an analogy of values ​​and secondary qualities to prove that the former are just as unreal as the latter. For Hume it constitutes a “considerable advancement of the speculative sciences” to show that our moral phenomenology is wrong when it treats evaluative properties analogously to geometric properties. Philosophical research corrects this error and shows that evaluative properties such as virtues and vices are not “qualities in the objects”, but mere “perceptions in the mind”. So, when modern weak realists use the analogy of secondary qualities in exactly the opposite direction to that of Hume and Locke to show that values ​​are just as real as those, they clearly must have a different view of the ontology of secondary qualities. This is exactly what a weak realist like McDowell does when he suggests distinguishing between two ways in which a property can be called objective:

In a first sense, properties are objective if one can understand what it means that they belong to an object without having to refer to their disposition to trigger certain subjective reactions. In this sense, neither secondary qualities such as colors nor value properties are to be seen as objective in the opinion of the weak realist - what it means that an object is yellow cannot be understood independently of the way in which it appears to beings with a certain perceptual apparatus. Likewise, and this is how weak realism distinguishes itself from strong realism, it is understandable what it means that an action is cowardly if one does not refer to the cognitive and affective reaction patterns with which we encounter such an action. Value properties and secondary qualities are therefore not objective in this first sense.

According to McDowell, however, they are that in a second sense, in which something is objective when it fulfills the following condition: “it is there to be experienced, as opposed to being a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience of it. ”It is precisely this objectivity that, first of all, undoubtedly belongs to secondary qualities - just as we can easily speak of the fact that someone misunderstands the true color of an object because he suffers from jaundice, for example, so we can also speak of someone because of of personal resentment characterizes an act as cowardly that is actually brave. And secondly, it is this second type of objectivity that is appropriate to the secondary qualities as specific phenomenal properties: that phenomenal qualities do not meet any standards of objectivity that cannot be reconciled with what they are, namely phenomenal, cannot be a cause for disappointment and should not be misunderstood - turning this against Hume and Locke - in the sense that they are mere projections of subjective experiences.

Reasons that speak for poor realism

These classificatory considerations on the delimitation of strong and weak moral realisms naturally leave the question unanswered as to whether moral realism should be represented in a weak or in the strong form. At least three reasons seem to speak for weak moral realism:

- The weak realism promises to decisively defuse Mackie's problem of ontological peculiarity: moral properties appear as a species of secondary qualities (so-called response-dependent properties), which are fundamentally no more problematic than other species such as colors.

- The weak realism also seems to allow a solution to the problem of the motivational force of morality. If subjectivity performances are themselves partially constitutive for moral properties, then these suggest themselves as candidates for the motivating states that, in the sense of the metaphor of a magnetism of the good, go hand in hand with our evaluations.

- Instead of having to explain why there is no convergence in the determination of subjective achievements of completely independent values ​​even under conditions of extensive knowledge and the best epistemic conditions, the weak realist can take a pluralistic position: some values ​​may be constituted by subjective attitudes, all of them Members of the human species are common. For the lack of convergence, the weak realist can refer to the tendency of people to shield themselves from normative claims that stand in the way of their self-interested projects. In other cases, however, attitudes specific to cultures or religious traditions may play a constitutive role for values; in this case the impression of a difference of opinion dissolves - instead of a single moral reality there is a plurality of such realities about which neither of the respective parties need be in error.

Too high a price

The weak realist pays for these apparent advantages at too high a price.

First, from a moral-phenomenological point of view, no partial dependence of moral values ​​on subjective performance can be established, as assumed by weak realism. This threatens to behave in a revisionary manner towards moral phenomenology, which undermines the basic presumption in favor of moral realism, which is based on its agreement with it. From this point of view, the difference between weak realists and projectivists appears to be merely of a degree: while the projectivist already considers the idea of ​​independence assumed by common sense to be erroneous, the weak realist sees common sense in error only with regard to the degree of this independence. Moral characteristics are not completely independent of subjective attitudes. Now the weak realist can simply accept the revisionary implications of his position - why should one consider common sense infallible with regard to one's own ontological obligations? The partial error about the degree of independence of a set of properties is not a specific problem of morality, as long as it can be shown that an analogous hyper-objectification can also be found in other areas, such as aesthetics.

Secondly, the question of how the subjective achievements can be individualized, which are supposed to be partially constitutive for moral values, creates a circle. Unlike colors, for example, morality lacks a robust phenomenology. We know what it is like to experience something as screaming yellow as opposed to a dull pink, but what does a tax on the rich feel like that we are then inclined to assess as fair or unjust? At this point, the weak realist is faced with a dilemma: he must either make use of precisely those properties that he wants to explain by individualizing the relevant subjective achievements through their objects, namely the corresponding evaluative properties to which they are directed, or but, in the absence of a robust phenomenology, he has to refrain from delimiting subjective modes of reaction specific to moral reality from other, irrelevant ones. In the first case, the weak moral realism threatens to collapse into the strong, in the second it threatens to become explanatory empty, insofar as it can only determine the subjective reaction and its object in an uninformative, circular way - what is morally wrong is moral indignation evokes, and an outrage must therefore be characterized as moral (and not, for example, aesthetic) because it relates to what is morally wrong.

Thirdly, even if the circularity problem can be avoided, the question remains whether weak realism can open up sufficient space for possibilities of moral error. Again a juxtaposition of moral values ​​on the one hand and colors as paradigmatic secondary qualities on the other leads to the core of the problem. In the counterfactual situation, in which all beings capable of visual perception perceive objects that appear yellow to us in the actual world as blue, we have little hesitation in saying that such objects are blue in such a world are - and not that their residents suffer from a regrettable defect that allows them to perceive objects that are actually yellow as blue. The parallel consequence in the realm of morality, however, seems unacceptable to us: in a world where all beings who use moral distinctions advocate torturing the innocent, we would by no means argue that this response makes torture morally acceptable; rather, we would insist on speaking of a collective moral deprivation that leads to the reprehensibility of such a practice being misunderstood.

The weak realist can, of course, simply deny that the idea of ​​such a sweeping possibility of error in the realm of morality makes sense. Now it seems to me, quite apart from the question of how probable a complete moral error is, at least necessary to leave conceptual space for its possibility - that we ourselves and not just the inhabitants of a possible world could be completely wrong, forms a firm one Part of our moral self-image.

These considerations suggest that moral properties in the sense of strong realism should be understood as completely independent of subjective performance. The central importance of subjectivity for a theory of morality is by no means disputed here; It is only disputed that subjective achievements are completely or partially constitutive for the moral properties themselves.

Strong moral realism and subjectivity

Strong moral realism takes account of the role of subjectivity in our practice of moral valuation in three important ways:

- Firstly, subjects or their actions form the subject of our moral evaluations: people are morally evaluated and not stones or quantum leaps. For this reason, in a world without subjects, there can be trivially no moral facts. It does not follow from this, however, that these facts are subjective in the sense of an ontological dependence on our subjective attitudes towards them. Moral facts are - in Svavarsdóttir's terminology - existentially dependent on subjects in the sense that they would not exist if there were no subjects. In this sense, intentional actions themselves, perceptions or pain are also existential subject-dependent. However, this existential dependency does not imply that the entities mentioned are dependent on the attitudes that subjects have towards them. The problem of existential dependency and that of ontological dependence on subjective attitudes are at odds with each other. For this reason, the counterfactual test of asking about moral values ​​in a world without subjects turns out to be too crude to capture the differentiations relevant here: In a world without subjects ipso facto there are no existentially dependent entities; But whether these are constituted (partially or completely) by subjective attitudes remains a completely open question. Accordingly, in a world without subjects, there would be nothing that could be judged morally; What is to be judged in this way, however, can be completely independent of the attitudes that subjects adopt towards it.

Second, properties of subjects are among the entities that make moral judgments true. Cruelty, for example, is a characteristic that can naturally only apply to subjects, and at the same time the reason for rightly calling the behavior of a cruel person morally reprehensible. Whether all entities that make moral judgments come true involve subjectivity can be left open here. However, no plausible normative ethics can do without recourse to the properties of subjects when it tries to clarify what makes actions morally right or wrong.

Third, moral terms can be understood as subjective in the sense that they can only be used meaningfully by beings who take a specifically human perspective, namely the perspective of beings with certain needs and goals. The terms with which we refer to moral properties are anthropocentric in this sense. Of course, this also does not imply any ontological dependence of these properties themselves on subjective achievements, not even in the sense of a no-priority theory. The fact that we can only perceive moral properties with the help of viewpoint-bound concepts does not mean that the elements that make up this viewpoint are partially or completely constitutive of what we perceive from it. The following example makes it clear that such a conclusion would be a non sequitur: I can only understand what it means that my neighbor is in pain if I take the standpoint of a being who is itself sensitive to pain; however, his pains are in no way constituted by my attitude towards them.

So we make moral evaluations with the help of terms that are tied to a specifically human perspective; what we evaluate are subjects and their actions; what makes these evaluations true or false are at least properties of subjects. Even the strong moral realist, contrary to the suspicion of involuntary reductio, can grant the indisputable right of subjectivity within our practice of moral evaluations; but he continues to deny that the subjective achievements of the evaluating subjects are in any way constitutive for the moral situation to be evaluated.

A plea for strong realism

These considerations suggest defending moral realism in its strong form: only if moral properties are interpreted in the sense of the strong condition of independence can the moral-phenomenologically founded presumption in favor of moral realism be adhered to without restrictions and at the same time not allowed for weak realism avoid coping circularity problem.

If one visualises the dialectical situation described at the beginning between noncognitivists, error theorists and moral realists, it becomes clear that the burden of proof that such strong realism has to assume has increased considerably elsewhere compared to weak forms of realism: This is how it appears prima facie it is less problematic to make the practical power of morality understandable when the moral properties are at least partially constituted by subjective achievements than when these are interpreted as being independent of them.

But what about the problems that arise from the question of the normative and motivational power of morality for strong moral realism? We already encountered the core of the problem when discussing Mackie's argument of oddity: Objective values, according to Mackie, “would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with [them], […] just because the end has to-be pursuedness somehow built into it. "

First of all, a distinction must be made between two independent dimensions of the problem of the practicality of moral values, namely between the problem of rationalism on the one hand, and motivational internalism on the other.

The problem of rationalism concerns the question of whether moral values ​​are intrinsically normative in the sense that they are a source sui generis for normative reasons. The rationalist assumes that it is, the anti-rationalist denies it. According to the rationalist, the very fact that an action is morally reprehensible constitutes a reason to refrain from doing it; according to the moral anti-rationalist, however, this fact only becomes normative if it is appropriately compared with the sources on which it is based Related to normativity; e.g. by referring to a wish to do what is morally right, which then, as a wish, establishes a reason for performing the action that is appropriate to fulfill it, in this case the omission of the morally reprehensible action.

The problem of internalism based on motivation theory, on the other hand, concerns the question of whether the existence of a genuine moral valuation necessarily implies that the person making the valuation is motivated (but at least pro tanto) to act accordingly. The motivation-theoretical internalist affirms this connection between valuation and motivation, the externalist rejects it.

Now it seems to me that a strong moral realist is indeed committed to a moral rationalism. Moral values ​​are characterized precisely by the fact that they are categorical in the sense that they substantiate good reasons, regardless of whether other sources of such reasons (e.g. wishes, interests) point in the same direction. Even if the morally required act does not meet any of my wishes or interests, I still have a reason to act that way. Moral values ​​are an independent source of normative reasons.

But whether someone who honestly makes a moral assessment is necessarily motivated to act accordingly is a question that the moral realist can and should answer in the negative. That everyone who recognizes a moral value therefore necessarily strives for it is a claim by Mackie that the moral realist has no reason to share. Why shouldn't someone with clinical depression, for example, honestly judge that a certain action is morally required of him and yet feel no motivation to act on it; We hear from psychologists that part of the suffering of certain cases of depression is that patients are well aware of this motivational ineffectiveness.

There is an internal connection between moral evaluation and moral motivation in the sense that no additional element is necessary to ensure motivation (e.g. a wish to do the morally right thing).The fact that I have promised someone I will lend them a book (provided that there are no other motives involved) can in itself constitute a sufficient motivating reason to lend them the book. According to the moral realist, moral evaluations are intrinsically motivating, but they are not necessarily motivating as the internalist of the theory of motivation assumes. The fact that I have made a promise gives me, in the sense of rationalism, a good reason to keep it; If I recognize the existence of this reason in an appropriate rating, then this good reason will also be able to motivate me to act accordingly, although not necessary - factors such as the depression in our earlier example can intervene - but reliably. What is at hand here is the basic structure of rational action in general. This is characterized by the fact that we act for the good reasons we have. Normative and motivational reasons therefore go hand in hand.

The practicality of morality in no way confronts strong moral realism with problems that make it appear ontologically strange. The assumption shared by error theorists such as Mackie and weak moral realists such as McDowell that strong moral realism obliges one to assume a moral dimension of reality which, on the one hand, is "torn apart" by its ontological independence from subjective achievements and their indisputable practical relevance for them on the other. turns out to be just as unfounded as the assumption that strong moral realism cannot adequately account for the role of subjectivity.

OUR AUTHOR:
Christoph Halbig is Professor of Practical Philosophy at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena. He has published on the topic: Practical Reasons and the Reality of Morals (Klostermann, Philosophische Abhandlungen Volume 94, Frankfurt 2007, XIV / 410 pp., Ct. € 49.—)

The text is based on this book and a lecture given on January 24th, 2008 at the Philosophy Department of the University of Konstanz. Shortened by the editorial staff.


Literature mentioned in the text:

Brink, David (1989): Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Korsgaard, Christine (1996): The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Mackie, John L. (1977): Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Hardmondsworth, Penguin.

McDowell, John (1981): "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following", in: St. Holtzman & Ch. M. Leich (eds.)., Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, London / Boston, pp. 141-162 .

McDowell, John (1985): Values ​​and Secondary Qualities “, in: Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity, London, pp. 110-129.

McDowell, John (1997): “Projection and Truth in Ethics”, in: Stephen Darwall et alii (eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice, Oxford, pp. 215-226.

Nagel, Thomas (1986): The View from Nowhere, New York / Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Schaber, Peter (1997): Moral Realism, Freiburg / Munich, Alber.

Svavarsdóttir, Sigrún (2001): “Objective Values. Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake? ”, In: B. Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals, Cambridge, pp. 144-193.