Is any religion really peaceful and tolerant

171 Fethi Meskini Tolerance and the existence as Ḏimmī or good neighbor beyond the norms »There is no compulsion in religion.« The Koran, 2: 256 »You respect neither a contract nor a protective relationship with a believer. It is they who commit the transgression. "The Koran, 9:10" Whoever kills someone under the protection of the pact will not smell the scent of paradise, although it can be perceived from a distance of a forty-year journey. " Ḥadīṯ of the Prophet "Why are so different from other citizens?" Voltaire, Traité sur la tolérance Introduction: The ›Ḏimmī-Existence‹ 1 or the Pact of Tolerance The only sura in which the Koran uses the word ḏimma2, d. H. ›Pact‹ used is indisputable at Tauba3; the name is used in multiple ways with 1 Since a translation of the French term dhimmité (Arabic: ḏimma) with ›Dhimmität‹ would not make sense in German, the term is used in different paraphrases in the text [note. d. Transl.]. 2 Ḏimma (protection (contract), custody, guarantee) is a term in Islamic law that defines the legal status of non-Muslim ›protected‹ under Islamic rule [note. d. Transl.]. 3 Der Koran, 9: 8. Retransmitted from Arabic by H. Bobzin with the assistance of K. Bobzin, Munich: Beck 22015. 172 “Amnesty”, “Remorse”, “Advertisement”, “Penance”, “Return” translated , but is also called al Barā'a in the sense of ›innocence‹, ›immunity‹, ›absolution‹ etc. This sura begins with an unusual feature for the sacred text, i. H. without beginning with the opening blessing "In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate and Merciful". This is a significant shortcoming. Paradoxically, the word paradimma4 comes from the verb ḏamma, which means something like ›denigrate‹, ›defame‹, ›belittle‹ etc. This corroborates Hegel's speculative remark about words that designate something and at the same time its opposite: ḏimma originally denotes all kinds of ›ḥarām‹ (everything that is forbidden, sacred, from what is protected, something that cannot be profaned without exposing oneself to atonement or committing injustice to an innocent person. In order to be able to speak of ›tolerance‹ in Islam, there is a speculative transition from the negative-moral meaning of maḏamma (censure, criticism, reproach), which implies a value judgment, to the positive, ethical-juridical meaning of ḏimma (pact, transfer agreement, protective contract, immunity ) necessary, who renounces judgment - a kind of religious epoché. The ḏimma or - to introduce another word - the "Ḏimmī existence" (dhimmité5) is the status of non-Muslims who - whatever religion or belief - under the umbrella of those wanted by the caliphate or some other Islamic authority Live legality; there is no need for any other justification than that of the pact that protects them. The ḏimmī belongs to the "people of the Scriptures" 6 (Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Sabaeans, etc.) who are not allowed to go into battle with the Muslims, but a ǧizya (a 4 Cf. C. Cahen, "Dhimma", in: Encyclopédie de l'Islam, II, pp. 234-238.5 With this terminological clarification we want to break with the polemical and confusing use of the unfortunate neologism ›thimmitude‹, which first appeared in 1982 and in a discourse in the Arabic language of the Christian Lebanese politician who was used by the assassinated President Bachir Gemayel (Bašīr al-Ǧumayyil, 1947–1982). See Leba non News (September 14, 1985), pp. 1f. 6 With "People of the Book" or "Book Owners" ( ahl al kitāb) refers to the followers of revelation religions who refer to holy scriptures such as the Torah, the Old and New Testaments or the Koran. Cf. Der Koran, 26: 46–47: »Only argue with book owners in a beautiful way but not with those of them who wickedly precht: ›We believe in what has been revealed on us and what has been revealed to you. Our God and your God are one. We are devoted to him. 'So we sent the book down on you. Those to whom we have given the book believe in it. Even among these there are some who believe in it. The unbelievers alone deny our signs. «FETHI MESKINI 173 TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS ḎIMMĪ per capita tax7) have to pay that they do not belong to Islam - freedom of conscience for about one dinar a year! The question that immediately arises is: Do these non-Muslims have civil rights or not? What does it mean to exist among them, with them, in community with them and as their neighbors in the land of the Muslims as ḏimmī? The core of the debate about the immī existence is ultimately the following question: Is this existence legitimately identifiable with citizenship (cito yenneté) or does it remain forever dependent on an 'apologetic' form of tolerance? 8 The ḏimmī generally appears as a kind of tolerant rule ›Tolerated‹ type of person who is not granted the status of full citizen. The difference between the ›tolerated‹ and the ›citizens‹, between the sphere of tolerance and the sphere of law, marks the demarcation line between religious morality and state power. But because Islam often confuses or identifies religious authority and political power, the distinction between ḏimmī and Muslim is not always clear. Occasionally the Muslim himself runs the risk of being treated like a neuerimmī of a new kind. The conflict of identity between majority and minority, which weighs on self-esteem in all forms of political community, adds another layer of difficulty to the problem. However, if one takes into account the aggravating fact that the caliphate knew neither the term ›citizen‹ nor that of ›citizenship‹ and consequently the Muslim himself never the status of the citizen of a civil or political society in the strict sense “Capitation” (per capita tax) was a practice in ancient Rome and even in the France of the Ancien Régime. 8 In modern Arabic, the European word ›tolerance‹ was first translated as tasāhul - permissiveness, relief, informality, being able to do and not be forced to do anything - and then finally as tasāmuḥ; this is the standard term used today to mean mutual forgiveness, approval, acceptance or forbearance. However, two aspects of Arabic word usage need to be pointed out: (i) Both words used as translations do not exist in the Quranic text; they are modern, post-Islamic inventions. (ii) They do not have the double meaning of the European expressions of tolerantia: (a) perseverance, patience, forbearance, resistance, and (b) indulgence, not forbidding (e.g. prostitution; in French the brothel becomes referred to as maison de tolérance), understanding, freedom of religious practice (civil tolerance). The word tasāmuḥ is not reminiscent of suffering to be 'endured', but of 'forgiving'. It is about mutual forgiveness without appeal to any right. 174, as it has been known since the Greco-Roman epoch and is reviving in the modern constitutional state, then the question arises as to what the legal status of the ḏimmī is. The Muslim himself is nothing but the ›subject‹ (raʿiyya) of a rule, the legality of which is exhausted in religious law. In Islam there is no citizenship, only the submission of believers. This is the meaning of the word dīn (religion), which etymologically means obedience, submission, intimidation, coercion, domination and submission. Citizen, subject and ḏimmī are three political degrees of obedience to any imperial power. In this article, I would like to draw attention to a normative fact that largely determined the space of coexistence with the ḏimmīs in medieval Muslim society - a special form of tolerance that could for the time being be called neighborly tolerance: tolerance without an object and without normatively fixed content. It does not result from any form of real moral participation that is fed from a fund of universalizable values. With the ḏimmīs “who do not believe in God and do not believe in Judgment Day, who do not forbid what God and His Messenger have forbidden, and who do not belong to the religion of truth - among the bookkeepers - until they humiliate the tribute paid by hand «9, the Muslim could neither share lived experience nor the ideal of existence. Yet the status of being ḏimmī would always retain its theoretical relevance and its remarkable normative value. We, the contemporaries of modern Muslim societies, could verify this if we agreed to reread one of the canonical texts on this subject, i.e. H. Aḥkām ahl aḏ ḏimma (legal provisions for those under protection) by Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya (1292-1350), the Hanbali-Muslim legal scholar famous in classical Islam. After reading this, one could rediscover the very special meaning that tolerance had in the caliphate: tolerance as the immunity of good neighborliness, as the fact of letting our roommates be in one and the same space in the world of life, i.e. H. to tolerate them without normative imposition to the limit of the unacceptable, provided that the ḏimmī always and inevitably keeps his word as a partner of the protection pact. In the following four points should be examined: (1) Who is the real, the non-Abrahamic ḏimmī? (2) The laws of Ḏimmī existence. (3) The ›dhimmite‹ tolerance towards the intolerable using the borderline example of Zoroastrian incest. (4) The new forms of Ḏimmī existence in modern Islam, or profanity and secularity. 9 The Koran, 9: 29. FETHI MESKINI 175 Ḏimmī Existence and the Legacy of Abraham: The Limits of Tolerance It is time to finally understand that the monotheistic difference is not between the Judeo-Christian on the one hand and the Muslim on the other hand, it exists as if it existed between the two banks of the same metaphysical river as the dividing line between paganism and monotheism. Monotheism was and is always a simple stylistic variation of the single onto-theological narrative, i.e. H. Abrahamic intuition to shift the divine from the worship of the stars to the worship of the personal God.10 It is the same family-like narrative that emerged from a limited number of key concepts such as Genesis, Adam, Revelation, Scripture, Prophecy, Abraham's family, religious beliefs etc. is composed and has for us for three thousand years formed the original pedestal of what was inherited from Abraham (abrahamité11), the first moral impetus of the monotheistic person, the most important ancestor of the modern subject and the first narrator of transcendence in the history of the present humanity. These founding illusions played the same role in the three great spiritual stories of the hostile brothers: that of Abraham, the great father of all, from an eschatological history of salvation, who introduced the transcendental justification of the soul's ability to transcend. Therefore, for a Muslim, the real other, the last religiously stranger, can be neither Jew nor Christian, but only the one who does not radically go back to Abraham, and this is undeniably the follower of Persian Mazdaism, the religion of Zarathustra. Only a Zoroastrian who worships fire and the stars can be considered the transcendental oppressor of the soul who believes in the legacy of Abraham. The Muslim legal scholars highlight and underline the difference between the 'People of the Book' and the Zoroastrians by recalling three essential lines of demarcation: 'They have no (holy) book at all, their ḍabīḥa (sacrifice, offering, flesh) is (for one Muslim) and it is absolutely forbidden (due to their incestuous practices) to eat their wives. 10 Cf. The Koran, 6: 76–79. 11 I owe the French expression »abrahamité« to the Islamologist Diane Steigerwald and the translator of ʿ Abd al-Karīm Šahrastānīs (1086– 1153) Majlis. Discours sur l'Ordre et la Création, Québec: Les Presses de l'Université de Laval 1998, p. 95. [Because there is no German equivalent for this term, it is used here with ›Abraham's legacy‹ or ›Abraham's Heritage ‹translated d. Transl.]. Marriage TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS IMMĪ 176. «12 It is an incurable break between the Abrahamic and the non-Abrahamic, which affects the tradition of the Book of Revelation, the sacrificial rituals and consanguinity. Those who are guilty of incendiary represent the insurmountable boundary to the intolerable.13 However, the recent debate about the Ḏimmī existence has been almost pathologically oriented towards systematically spreading political hatred between the brothers and common heirs of Abraham , between Muslims and Jews or between Muslims and Christians, and this under the unfortunate keyword of the Ḏimmī lot. But the real core of Ḏimmī existence belongs to a different moral sphere, the sphere of separation between the heirs of Abraham and the Mazadeans; everything else is a family quarrel. Religious polemics like that of Bat Ye'or14 only distort the debate about the Ḏimmī existence - this central concept of tolerance in Islam - by placing them without any promise of conversation in the context of a dreary culture of resentment towards what the Ḏimmī -Existence matters, pull it down. Bat Ye’or's guiding thesis is: To speak of Islamic tolerance towards the ḏimmīs (the wards) is a historical lie that overlooks the normative facticity of jihad, which simply means the submission of non-Muslims; for the teachings of Islam condone neither the equality between Muslims and ḏimmīs nor their self-affirmation. But this version of the supposed Ḏimmī experience of the non-Muslims under medieval Islamic rule deliberately misjudges the moral complexity of the experience of this existence on the soil of Islam; it is blind to the relevance and ethical achievement of this mode of existence. The activism in favor of the ḏimmīs or against them, which shaped the polemical disputes between Christians, Jews and Muslims both in the Middle Ages and in modern times, was always of a political nature. The type of 12 Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya, Aḥkām ahl aḏ ḏimma (legal provisions for those under protection), Bairūt: Dār Ibn Ḥazm 2008; See Introduction, p. 8, p. 11 and § 158, p. 302 ff. 13 Ibid., p. 302 f. 14 Cf. Bat Ye'or, Le Dhimmi: profil de l'opprimé en Orient et en Afrique du Nord depuis la conquête arabe, Paris: Anthropos 1980. Extended new edition under the title Juifs et chrétiens sous l'islam: les dhimmis face au défi intégriste, Paris: Berg international 1994. Cf. Ders., Les chrétientés d'Orient entre jihâd et dhimmitude: VIIe – XXe siècle, Paris: Editions du Cerf 1991; dt. The decline of oriental Christianity under Islam. Between jihad and dhimmitude. 7-20 Century, transl. v. K. Maier, with a preface. v. H. Busse, Graefelfing: Resch Verlag 2002. FETHI MESKINI 177 claim to validity, which has shaped the attitude of Islam towards the ḏimmīs from the beginning, and the complexity of the understanding of the meaning of tolerance on which the concept of Ḏimmī existence is based. According to Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya, God Himself commanded us to protect the people of Scripture in the 'House of Islam' for a reason relating to divine 'Wisdom': 'Notwithstanding their faithlessness, they are witnesses to the origin of the prophecies, the uniqueness of God, the Last Judgment, Paradise and Hell.And in their writings the announcements of our Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) and the information about his surnames, the qualities and attributes of his community (umma), belong to the signs of his prophecy and proofs of his message [...]. For with the same prophecy as his earlier brothers he is one of God's ambassadors. «15 The Muslim has to share with the Jewish or Christian ḏimmī the essentials of his origin from Abraham: the biblical testimony, the revealed proclamation and the confession of brotherhood. From this, the Existenzimmī existence draws the three characteristics that structure it: testify, occur and enter into an alliance. And yet the “fanaticism of the mob” remains “superstitious and irascible: he sees monsters in his brothers because they do not have the same religion as himself.” 16 How can this hatred, which appears to be innate, be cured? The Law of Ḏimmī Existence: The Tolerant Attitude in Islam After the caliphs' conquest of the territories populated by non-Muslims (People of the Scriptures, Mazadeans, Sabaeans, etc.), the new imperial power was faced with an entirely new question: how could one dominate the body politically and at the same time allow freedom of conscience in religious terms? To distinguish between the political Muslim regime and the moral regime of the non-Muslims became an increasingly inevitable objective requirement. There is no shortage of precise and appropriate historical studies on the subject of Ḏimmī existence in Western literature.17 Rainer 15 Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya (fn. 12), p. 14. 16 Voltaire, Traité sur la tolérance, Paris: Flammarion 1989 , P. 33. Cf. German: Voltaire, The Calas Affair About Tolerance, ed. and with an afterword v. I. Gilcher-Holtey, Berlin: Insel Verlag 2011. 17 Cf. A. T. Khoury, Toleranz im Islam, Munich: Kaiser Verlag 1980, pp. 138– 176; G. Krämer, Democracy in Islam. The struggle for tolerance and freedom in the Arab world, Munich: C.H. Beck 2001, pp. 125-145. TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS ḎIMM 178 Forst's monumental investigation of the different conceptions of tolerance in the past and present provides a suitable framework for corresponding reconstructions of tolerantia and tolera re in the context of the two families of Abrahamic descendants, the Jewish and the Christian. Forst currently sees a philosophically favorable moment to reconstruct the potential of tolerance in all existing religions.18 Against the problem-reducing and polemical tendency of the discourses on the status of the ḏimmīs (dhimmitude) as the status of a religious minority oppressed under the Islamic caliphate rule One would have to endeavor to reconstruct the Ḏimmī situation of non-Muslims in Islam with the aim of showing the complexity associated with the term Ḏimmī existence, the variety of its meanings and theological-political uses. It is a matter of emphasizing a conception of tolerance that takes into account the neighbors that are different from the self or foreign neighbors, but not a normative concept that fixes this trans-social value. Because why should one ask for a single universal concept of tolerance? Is such a concept even possible? Is it inevitable? Perhaps one should take seriously the possibility of a strict distinction between the (not possible) universal and the (desired) universalizable. 18 Cf. R. Forst, Tolerance in Conflict. History, content and present of a controversial term, Frankfurt / M .: Suhrkamp 2003. Regardless of the correctness of the theoretical reconstructions of the fundamental tolerance problems in the Western tradition presented in this book, Forst's selection of the representatives of Judaism and Islam appears to be in need of discussion. Maimonides and Averroes are two theologian-philosophers who did not directly address the problem of tolerance in the two communities. Your attempt to reconcile or harmonize the Aristotelian philosophy with religious belief can perhaps be understood as a kind of premodern Enlightenment. Forst's relation to the question of tolerance towards others (more precisely: to the ḏimmīs) remains a bit speculative: the defense of the ›freedom to philosophize‹ (tolerance in internal Islamic theological disputes) and the ›rational defense of religious law‹ (tolerance regarding of other religions) do not really help in the analysis of the ethical and political exceptional situation of a person who is condemned to profess a belief classified as 'unfaithful', to live with a body condemned as incestuous and as an individual who is a citizen governed by a lesser status. The complexity of the Islamic concept of tolerance is more to be found in the juridical writings that Muslim legal scholars have devoted to the question of the immī existence. FETHI MESKINI 179 The Ḏimmī existence was not due to mere 'toleration', but to a genuine attitude of tolerance, as is possible within the limits of a political community, the basis of which is theological-political power. Perhaps one would have to distinguish between attitudes towards the ḏimmī as an object (the tolerant who feels offended by power) and as a subject (the tolerant who takes care of the ḏimmī morally and legally). This distinction has its limits, of course. For the term Bezeichnungimmī involves a much more complex experience than that of hostility towards the stranger or towards the enemy in a state of war. The attitude of tolerance is not directed towards an enemy or prisoner of war, but towards a being with whom one has to share the 'house of being'. In Arabic dār al islām, the ›house of Islam‹, means the earth inhabited by Muslims, the Muslim ecumenism in contrast to dār al ḥarb, the ›house of war‹. Ḏimmī existence belongs to the lexicon of an intellectual geography introduced by the rise of Islamic rule, whose social basis is a community that owes its existence to the machinery of war and which for the first time dreams of a state apparatus according to its own measure. The Islamic government is the first state apparatus that was able to bring the Arabs together in the form of a world political history. Ḏimmī existence is a world concept, but not simply a word of denominational polemics. Today one would have to integrate the term into the lexicon of the ethics of care, the care for the other than the neighbors belonging to one's own roots. Therefore, behavior towards the ḏimmī cannot be reduced to an instrumental handling of beliefs that could be changed or destroyed. It is not indifferent behavior: the non-Muslim neighbor is there, with us and among us, in the midst of an already existing interpersonal sphere. The question is: How can one allow the ḏimmī to participate in communicative Islamic activity without requiring him to become a Muslim? The difference between the Islamic element and the Muslim personality could play an essential role here: whether Jewish, Christian or Zoroastrian, the ḏimmī is simply a type of Islamic person, but without the need to become a Muslim. Under its symbolic umbrella, Islam offers all ḏimmīs living under its authority a special type of affiliation, i.e. H. the cultural atmosphere of Islamic people in all their forms: as Muslims, but also as Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians etc. The Ḏimmī existence should therefore be understood as the typical structure of the encounter between Islamic rule and non-Muslim peoples. When speaking of ḏimmīs, this has the function of neutralizing TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS ḎIMMĪ 180 the authority of Sharia (šarīʿa) for non-Muslim Islamic persons. For them, the laws of Ḏimmī existence replace the laws of Sharia. It is true, however, that the ḏimmī was not respected, but protected. The protection pact for the ḏimmīs was originally a security pact. In any case, the per capita tax was not only a 'rent' for the apartment in Islam, it was also a sign of 'humiliation' 19 - but a humiliation that only affected male adults, the 'one dinar a year' 20, even itself had to pay less than one dinar21 and could still be exempt from it22; In return, they received protection not only for their life, but also for their way of life: they received freedom of conscience! Children, women, the mentally ill, the poor, the elderly, monks and slaves were exempt from tax liability.23 The attitude towards the ḏimmīs is not a matter of respectful tolerance towards a person recognized as autonomous, but rather 'tolerance' to protect a population in the state of exception - the non-Muslim as such. To be voluntarily settled in the sphere of the 'not-', the non-Muslim, the non-believer, the non-citizen, puts the ḏimmī in the proud but precarious position of a stranger of his own free will. While the modern concept of tolerance is based on the category of autonomy24, the concept of Ḏimmī existence does not take into account the tolerated subject as a person with the right to an existence according to one's own way of life, i.e. H. with the ability to justify oneself for one's own reasons, but rather feeds on the idea of ​​the testament, which goes back to Abraham and which is similar to the Roman entails: the ḏimmīs were entrusted to Islamic rule and also to the Muslims themselves as a human deposit25, which was before all denominational disputes was to preserve. The non-Muslim must be protected as a being who has inferior political rights and at the same time a need for protection from power. The status of the Ḏimmī existence is understood as minority status. In this respect, the existence of the ḏimmīs under Islamic rule always remains a state of permanent exception: it consists in being able to refrain from joining the Muslim faith. The ḏimmī is 19 Cf. Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya (fn. 12), pp. 24-26. 20 Ibid., P. 29. 21 Cf. ibid., P. 30. 22 Cf. ibid. 23 Cf. ibid., P. 35, pp. 39-40, p. 42, p. 45. 24 Cf. R. Forst (fn. 18). 25 Cf. The Koran, 33: 72. FETHI MESKINI 181 the only Islamic ruler who is not affected by the articles of the Sharia, which are strictly limited to the faithful. In any case, the minority status of the immī has been chosen and accepted. The ḏimmī maintains the status of non-Muslim for good reasons and continues to live with his fellow Muslim citizens. Therefore ḍimmī existence does not require mutual tolerance. The tolerability of the beliefs and rites of the ḏimmīs is not up for discussion. The validity of the Ḏimmī status does not require any justification. In principle, the ḏimmī existence is linked to the protection of what cannot be justified: the explicit refusal to join the state religion. The political will to separate obedience (to Islamic rule) and not to believe (in the belief of Muslims) is already the basis of a canonical concept of tolerance in the context of classical Islam. The ḏimmī does not have to justify its existence. Conversely, the decision to protect it does not imply acceptance of its values. Therefore, the normative solution on which Rainer Forst's reconstruction of the tolerance problem is based26 cannot be helpful in understanding the complexity of Ḏimmī existence. Because this is not based on the universal validity of a moral norm; it is not based - as Forst assumes - in mutually and generally justifiable norms in a context in which they claim reciprocal and general validity, but rather in an ethic of good neighborliness. In a context in which - to use Forst - the right to justification does not exist, the concept of tolerance, which is based on practical (justifying) reason, becomes ineffective. The four constitutive elements of tolerance reconstructed by Forst can nonetheless help us to grasp the range of meaning indicated by the immī existence: (i) The Muslim need not share his concept of the good and the good life with the īimmī. (ii) Islam recognizes with Sharia27 the existence of universally valid 26 cf. Forst (fn. 18). 27 The Arabic word šarīʿa originally means “path”, “path” in a sense close to the Greek “method”. The verb šaraʿa has the meanings of ›open‹, ›clear‹, ›pave a way‹, ›suck up‹, ›begin‹, ›open‹, ›begin‹, ›let in‹, ›orient‹, ›sharpen ‹,› Elevate ‹and› be brave ‹. Islam is therefore a performative act through and through: paving the way to God, letting go to him, orienting oneself in his field. It does not fix any moral categorical imperative, no universally wearable ready-made clothing. Human reason has no other task than to decipher the divine 'signs' (the suras of the Koran are composed of āyāt, signs) and to ponder their meanings. In a word: It does not have the TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS ḎIMMĪ 182 norms. (iii) The Muslim can tolerate ideas of good that he considers immoral (e.g. Zoroastrian incest). (iv) He does not condemn the ḏimmī even if he relies on terms that violate the criterion of reciprocity and generality. The Ḏimmī existence does not recognize the essential conceptual difference between moral norms and ethical values. For them, the (Greco-Roman) debate about it takes place beyond the sphere of the Abrahamic virtues. It does not rely on the benefits of any form of justification. The attitude towards ḏimmīs as tolerance of the intolerable: The case of the Zoroastrian incest Let us recall the disturbing definition of the Zoroastrians by Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya, this Muslim legal scholar of the 14th century: »They have no (holy) book at all, their ḥabīḥa (Sacrifice, offering, meat) is inedible (for a Muslim) and it is absolutely forbidden (due to their incestuous practices) to marry their wives. ”28 The main point of this denominational definition is the word incest. In addition, there is an epistemological issue to be considered, mentioned by a follower of sheepism (Šāfiʿiyya), one of the four schools (maḍāhib) of Sunni jurisprudence: »There is no dispute [among the legal scholars of Islam] about marriage and sexuality (nikāḥ ) given the Zoroastrian; They disagreed about the Jews and Christians, but there was no dissent about the Zoroastrians. ”29 Here we are dealing with a typical example of the problem of tolerance, the case of the intolerable. The key to a possible solution to this moral aporia can be found in Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya, beginning with the second page of his original text, where he refers to a right to universal legislation ascribed to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth caliph, not the right to Setting up new tableaus of values ​​on a new level order. The Koran speaks of ›world (s)‹ or ›world residents‹ (The Koran, 1: 2), i. H. in the extension of the world, but neither of 'universe' nor of 'universality'. The indefinite - positive or negative - pronouns such as ›whoever‹, ›nothing‹, ›everything‹, ›all‹, ›one‹ etc., which are found in abundance in the Koranic text, always like the grammatical appearance convey to be able to serve to universal logical statements. But this does not constitute evidence of normative universality. 28 Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya (fn. 12). 29 Ibid., P. 303. FETHI MESKINI 183 refers to a statement about which the Imam aš-Šāfiʿī (767-820) reported. Ibn Qayyim al-Ǧawziyya writes: »I am a great connoisseur of the Zoroastrians; they had a science to teach and a book to study, but one day their king got drunk and slept with his daughter or sister, but some of his kingdom caught him by surprise.When he awoke, they wanted to inflict the appropriate atonement on him, but he opposed it and turned to the people of his kingdom with the question: Do you know a better religion than that of Adam, who married his sons to his daughters? I am a follower of Adam's religion! Soon a part of his people followed him and fought those who were not in agreement with him until they succeeded in killing them. However, one morning they discovered that their sacred book had been stolen and the science that was in their hearts had been stolen from them. Consequently, they are part of the People of the Book, and the Messenger of God (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), Abū Bakr and ʿUmar have accepted that they will pay a per capita tax. ”30 Given the Zoroastrian incest, the Muslim legal scholars have adopted the attitude of tolerance on two levels: on the one hand, a narrative tolerance: the Zoroastrians belong in the meta-narrative relating to Abraham; one must behave towards them as towards the people of the Scriptures, 31 for they claim to belong to the Adam family; on the other hand, there is a Jewish tolerance: they are only affected by Muslim jurisprudence by chance and unexpectedly enter the path of Sharia law without actually belonging to its original addressees. The ḏimmī is an accidental subject with a right that happens to him, the symptom of an incurable moral break such as incest. And yet: The fact that those who are guilty of incest are accepted within the Islamic community is as such a typical scandal of tolerance! The Zoroastrian marriages are regarded as incestuous, but without being judged formally or legally as ineffective. They can be considered justified under two conditions: (i) if no appeal is lodged in an Islamic court and consequently the application of Sharia law is accepted as a legal authority; (ii) if the couple did not believe that the act in question was prohibited or legally ineffective. 32 30 Ibid., p. 8. 31 Ibid., p. 276. 32 Ibid. TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS ḎIMM 184 If the blood-molester lives within his sphere of values, within the limits of his conception of the good and his way of life, he can be tolerated. The tolerability of incest does not imply any agreement with the normative sphere to which it belongs. The following aspect should be pointed out here. Indeed, incest appears to be a grave and unjustifiable moral error. But from the point of view of the Muslim legal scholar, the erroneous belief and apostasy (kufr) as well as idolatry (širk) or polytheism are far more serious and catastrophic than the practice of incest. The normative hierarchy of life forms is not based on their moral validity, but on the degree of honesty of the faith that is practiced. The religious commandment here determines the normative rank of a moral value. One is not a believer because one is virtuous; rather, one is virtuous because one is a believer. This is not a casual aspect. Rather, it illuminates the Islamic understanding of tolerance formulated under the title of Ḏimmī existence. It follows from a shift in meaning in the concept of justice: If the Sharia does not apply to the ḏimmīs, this is no reason to be unjust to them. Meta-justice is possible thanks to the idea of ​​Ḏimmī existence, i.e. H. if this is understood as a religious epoch, as the suspension or interruption of the Sharia law in favor of non-Muslims, and indeed, as one could say, under the title of the exercise of power in an exceptional state understood in the sense of Carl Schmitt or Giorgio Agamben. Far from being an instance of exclusion, the Ḏimmī status has the function of deliberately securing human inclusion. While the explicit justification of the ought following from the Ḏimmī existence with regard to the people of the Scriptures is guaranteed in the Abrahamic category of adamity33, i.e. man as the image of God, the tolerance of the ḏimmīs with regard to the incestuous Zoroastrians cannot be understood otherwise are then considered a commandment of humanity. The Abrahamic attitude knew no other figure of the person than that of Adam. In relation to a Zoroastrian, the claim to humanity still remains! For the normal medieval Muslim, this was part of the ethics of a purely neighborly relationship. Being the neighbor of a non-Muslim did not pose a normative problem, but was justified in the normative silence about the value of existence or the way of life lived by the neighbor who wants to be a stranger, and 33 Ibid., P. 76. Here one encounters terms such as ›Debt of the Adamites‹, ›Rights of the Adamites‹. FETHI MESKINI 185 to the point of silence about incest, which is intolerable in all societies - even in those societies that legally allow homosexual marriage. In conclusion: Ḏimmī existence and secularity or the loneliness of the modern Muslim "One must always start from the point where one is and from where the nations have arrived," said Voltaire in his Traité sur la tolérance.34 Then what about today's Muslim? It is true that the ḏimmīs could only perceive repressive tolerance in the Islamic state of their existence. And yet the reconstructed concept of Ḏimmī existence offers, or so it is to be hoped, a favorable context for working out an expanded meaning of post-Islamic citizenship. Its communicative function is not only to enable us to accept others (Jews, Christians, etc.), but precisely to accept ourselves as a modern Muslim. Because the intolerable changes over time.35 With the advent of modernity, interpreted here as a post-Islamic epoch, the concept of Ḏimmī existence has moved away from the secularized linguistic usage of the ›Arab nation state‹, this national-identitarian state apparatus which, according to the juridical, but independence not accompanied by real political autonomy was hastily forged. The understanding of alterity or 'neighborhood' as a state of emergency has been internalized in the Muslim self: what was once Ḏimmī existence now appears under names such as 'secularity', 'secularity', 'Francophone orphanage', moral 'communism', 'western materialism' ‹,› Dependence on foreign countries ‹,› Libertinage ‹or› Pornography ‹, also under› Modernism ‹and even under› Democracy ‹as a form of atheism. Classical Islam knew the word 'profanity'; dunyā, the here-on-earth, the world, the realm of the profane, is the earthly life in contrast to the life on the other side or ā ,ira, i.e. H. to the “last” or “other” life. But this profanity, so much discussed in Islamic discourses, was forgotten for the long term in order to be able to ascribe all sorts of malicious accusations to modern secularity. A whole literary genre has become the systematic defamation 34 Voltaire (fn. 16), p. 56. 35 Cf. S. Žižek, Plaidoyer en faveur de l'intolérable, Paris: Climats, Flammarion 2007, p. 71 ff. TOLERANCE AND DIE EXISTENZ AS ḎIMMĪ 186 dedicated to modernity reduced to anti-religious secularism. The final title of this type of discourse is fatwa because of blasphemy. A linguistic issue deserves mention here. The Arabic word takfīr has two opposing meanings: it denotes (i) the act of blasphemy, the accusation of a Muslim of being unfaithful; H. to behave physically or mentally as kāfir, like the people of the scriptures and consequently like āimmīs; (ii) the act of repenting, paying for one's mistakes or correcting a mistake with just punishment. The ǧizya, the per capita tax, was understood by Islamic legal scholars to mean that it could be taken as 'punishment' or 'penance' for the irreparable mistake of being 'kāfir' or unfaithful.36 One thing that is no less confusing is to add: The Arabic word for 'think' is nothing more than the reversal of a single letter in the word takfīr - it is tafkīr! In Islam, thinking (tafkīr) always runs the risk of putting us in the initial sphere of takfīr, blasphemy and due penance. For what? Just for having taken the course of a ḏimmī. The modern Muslim has great difficulty in accepting himself and tolerating himself in his modern, objectively or colonially secularized identity, i.e. H. as an individualized and no longer communalized self-experience. The object of our modern existence causes problems: the fact of feeling like a deminished type of human being, as someone who has been thrown into the modern world without any confirmation of the autonomous self. Islamist fundamentalism is not religious nihilism, but primarily a self-denial, a radical intolerance of a disappointing new self-being that has been baptized with the name of modern identity, a name among the many names of the current Arab nation-states. To be Tunisian, Egyptian, Algerian is an unacceptable modern insult to a jihadist Salafist's identity. Because its true original identity can only be Islam, but not the system of identity papers imposed by the nation-state, the last promise of which is the atheistic rejection of religious law - in democracy. The really not tolerated subject in today's post-Islamic world is the modern Muslim himself. His only irreparable mistake, for which he can lose his life, and not just his way of life, is his modern facticity. The process of violent ›re-Islamization‹ ends with the judgment of the actual, factual Muslims themselves as full-fledged ḏimmīs. The Muslim now faces a new challenge: he must prove his Islamicism. This means, in 36 Ibid., P. 17: "The punishment of the ǧizya [poll tax] is worse than bondage." FETHI MESKINI 187 to be accepted in one's own country and in one's own culture as a self that is part of one's subjectivity the Islamic cultural identity is; this also means not concocting a new identity profile for yourself, the source of which this time would be the transcendental pre-Islamic past of the territory. In a word, the Ḏimmī existence ends when it affects the Muslim - even in the unfortunate form of an oppressive dhimmitude. Translated from the French by Hans Jörg Sandkühler TOLERANCE AND EXISTENCE AS ḎIMMĪ